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justice Ginsburg's Umbrella 
Ellen D. Katz 
I. Introduction 
Near the end of her dissent in Shelby County v. Holder,1 Justice Ginsburg 
suggested a simple analogy to illustrate why the regional protections 
of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) were still necessary. She wrote that 
"[t]hrowing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to 
work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your 
umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet."2 
The image went viral in the aftermath of the decision. It appeared 
in media accounts, academic commentary, fundraising appeals, and 
sundry blogs. And for good cause. The image crisply captured why the 
VRA's supporters3 believed the preclearance regime remained necessary 
and why they thought scrapping it would be so damaging. It is still rain-
ing, they had been urging, and the umbrella the VRA offers continues to 
provide critical protection. Throw out that umbrella, the argument went, 
and lots of people are sure to get soaked.4 
Curiously, the Shelby County majority seemed to agree. Chief Justice 
Roberts's opinion for the Court held § 4(b) of the VRA unconstitutional 
and thereby rendered the preclearance regime inoperarive.5 But while 
the Chief justice discarded the umbrella Justice Ginsburg deemed so 
important, he never disputed the consequences she said would follow 
from doing so. Indeed, the reasons he provided for shutting down the 
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preclearance regime suggested that he, too, expected that many people 
would get wet as a result of the decision. 
It tuzns out that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg disagreed 
about a different point entirely. To belabor the analogy-something, be 
warned, this chapter will do repeatedly-the Justices disagreed about 
whether getting wet was worse than carrying an umbrella. For the Chief 
justice, carrying an umbrella, at least one like the VRA's preclearance 
regime, is an extremely costly and damaging activity. By contrast, Justice 
Ginsburg viewed getting wet as the more damaging experience. She rec-
ognized that carrying an umbrella may be inconvenient and even costly 
but, in her view, well worth the bother. Keeping dry should be the prior-
ity. 
The "umbrella" at issue in Shelby County was, without doubt, an unusual 
one. With its regionally applicable, burden-shifting requirements, the 
VRA's preclearance regime has long been understood to be an "excep-
tionaJ" and "extraordinary" statute.6 Disagreement among the Justices 
about its continued use might accordingly be minimized or even dis-
missed as a regime-specific dispute. And yet, I will argue that the differ-
ent ways in which the majority and dissent in Shelby County valued get-
ting wet and staying dry exposes a more foundational and far-reaching 
disagreement. 
Specifically, this chapter presses the idea that Chief Justice Roberts's 
willingness to discard Justice Ginsburg's umbrella reveals a distinct con-
ception of federal antidiscrimination law. It is a conception that sees the 
existing regime to be a source of unjust enrichment to its beneficiaries. 
Under this view, the regime does not simply make victims of undeni-
able discrimination whole but instead places a host of interested parties, 
victims included, in a decidedly better position than they would have 
been had the discrimination never occurred. For this reason, the regime 
is viewed to be a costly and damaging enterprise that should be limited 
at every opportunity. 
Notably, this conception of federal antidiscrimination law does not 
deny the persistence of discrimination, and indeed, discrimination of 
the old-school, unconstitutional variety. To be sure, adherents of this 
view continue to be concerned that the linkage between challenged con-
duct and invidious intent has become too attenuated in some, and per-
haps most, cases? But their more pressing worry is that the regime today 
does more harm than the discrimination it presently addresses, even 
when that discrimination is indisputably unconstitutional or otherwise 
invidious in nature. 
Put differently, the issue disputed in Shelby County, and in a host of 
other contemporary civil rights cases, is not about whether people are 
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still getting wet but whether it is worth it to keep them dry. And for 
a majority of the present Court-and a majority for some time 
now-keeping dry is no longer cost-justified. 
*** 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Part I explores why the Shelby County 
majority discarded Justice Ginsburg's umbrella. Specifically, it argues 
that Chief Justice Roberts did not mistake dry conditions for a problem 
solved but instead implemented a considered preference for getting 
wet. Part II situates this preference in a larger jurisprudence, in which 
a majority of the Court has limited the use of the umbrella provided 
by federal antidiscrimination law even as it acknowledged the rain to be 
ongoing. Part III argues that these cases represent a distinct strand in the 
Court's long-standing antipathy to federal antidiscrimination law, one 
that seeks to limit the regime based on the belief that it is more costly 
than the discrimination it presently addresses. 
II. Was It Raining in Shelby County? 
Much of the debate preceding the Court's decision in Shelby County 
focused on the conditions for political participation in covered jurisdic-
tions. No one disputed that these conditions had improved markedly 
since Congress first crafted the statute and that the VRA itself was largely 
responsible for these improvements. 8 What was disputed was the extent 
to which these improvements were dependent on the VRA's continued 
operation and the degree of backsliding that would occur if the regime 
were scrapped. In other words, the dispute concerned whether or not 
the rain had stopped. 
Justice Ginsburg's umbrella analogy captured what supporters of the 
VRA had been arguing-namely, that the improved conditions in cov-
eredjurisdictions existed only because the preclearance regime actively 
blocked misconduct where it applied. Under this view, the VRA was not 
only responsible for improved conditions in covered jurisdictions, but 
its continued operation was essential to maintaining those conditions. 
As Justice Ginsburg explained, do not mistake dry conditions under the 
umbrella for a sunny day. 9 
The regime's critics countered that conditions in covered jurisdictions 
looked better because they were better and that preclearance no longer 
had much to do with it.10 After all, some rainy days turn into sunny ones, 
and when they do, putting away the umbrella makes a lot of sense. It 
was, notably, this view that animated Chief Justice Roberts's suggestion 
in 2009 that the preclearance regime might be nothing more than an 
elephant whistle, shooing away a nonexistent threat. 11 
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And yet, the Chief Justice's opinion in Shelby County did not pursue this 
line of argument. True, it dismissed a defense based on deterrence as 
analytically flawed, explaining that deterrence could always be invoked 
to justify the regime even if evidence on the ground suggested the risk 
of backsliding was negligible.12 What the opinion did not do, however, 
was take issue with justice Ginsburg's argument that severe backslid-
ing would occur absent the preclearance regime. Indeed, Chief Justice 
Roberts declined to dispute Justice Ginsburg's characterization of the 
evidence. He did not question the scope of unconstitutional conduct she 
described or the consequences she said would follow from the Court's 
ruling in Shelby County. 
justice Ginsburg described that evidence in detail, and her description 
made clear that she thought the evidence left no doubt that it was still 
raining in places like Shelby County, Alabama. She cited numerous 
examples in which covered jurisdictions violated both the VRA and the 
Constirution.13 She observed, moreover, that contemporary unconsti-
tutional conduct in covered jurisdictions remained remarkably wide-
spread even as the evidence showed that the preclearance regime 
worked to deter and block a good deal of misconduct in covered juris-
dictions.14 Put differently, the evidence showed how preclearance, much 
like a real umbrella, operated imperfectly as a shield against the rain and 
that this imperfect protection provided a good indication of what would 
follow should the umbrella be discarded. 
The Shelby County majority likely viewed the evidence Justice Ginsburg 
cited more equivocally. Much of it involved dilution claims stemming 
from redistricting disputes of the sort that once prompted the Chief 
Justice to lament this "sordid business, this divvying us up by race.''15 
More broadly, the Shelby County majority no doubt suspected that many 
of the examples cited by Justice Ginsburg and collected in the congres-
sional record sounded more in discriminatory effect than intent or sim-
ply tracked a jurisdiction's inability to disprove animus rather than its 
affirmative existence. 
But insofar as the Justices in the majority held these suspicions, Chief 
Justice Roberts opted not to voice them.16 Rather than take issue with 
Justice Ginsburg's characterization of the evidence, the Chief Justice 
concluded that the discrimination she described as she described it was 
legally insufficient to justify the statute's continued regional applica-
tion.17 As explanation, he observed that this discrimination was not as 
severe as it was when Congress first crafted the regime in 1965; that it had 
not led Congress to alter the statute's preexisting coverage formula; and 
that it encompassed subjects different from the ones that Congress listed 
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in the coverage formula when it first subjected places to the regime's 
requirements.18 
I have explained elsewhere why these observations, all of which are 
true, should have been insufficient to render preclearance obsolete-and 
indeed should have been irrelevant-under applicable doctrine that the 
Shelby County majority did not purport to displace.19 For present pur-
poses, however, the doctrinal inadequacy of these observations rnatters 
less than what they expose about the Court's toleration for unremedied 
or inadequately remedied discrimination, including, notably, discrimi-
nation that violates the Constitution. And it turns out that the Court is 
willing to tolerate quite a bit. 
For example, Chief justice Roberts observed that the discrimination 
documented in the 2006 record was not as severe as the discrimination 
that first led Congress to enact the VRA. As he noted, the record evidence 
did not "showO anything approaching the 'pervasive,' 'flagrant,' 'wide-
spread,' and 'rampant' discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and 
that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the 
Nation at that time."20 
The Chief Justice was certainty correct about this. The 2006 record 
documented a host of ugly incidents but nothing that rose to a level 
equivalent to the systemic, brazen defiance of constitutional norms that 
defined the pre-VRA South. Even with the aggressive backsliding now 
under way in places like Texas and North Carolina, no one expects con-
ditions to deteriorate to the level that prompted Congress to enact the 
statute in the first place. 
That's good news, as far as it goes, but it does not explain why contem-
porary, persistent, and prevalent unconstitutional discrimination in cov-
ered jurisdictions should not be remedied in the manner in the manner 
Congress had selected. The Warren Court had recognized Congress to 
possess close to plenary authority when crafting remedies for unconsti-
tutional racial discrimination in voting.21 And even when the Rehnquist 
Court pulled back, requiring a tight connection between remedies and 
unconstitutional conduct, it never suggested that some constitutional 
violations were more worthy of remedy than others.22 That Court's con-
cern was with remedies that targeted conduct that was not itself uncon-
stitu tional rather than with gradations among constitutional injuries. 
Shelby County, by contrast, appears to stake out a distinction between 
discrimination of the extreme Jim Crow variety, and the more contained 
type of unconstitutional conduct we see today. And it suggests that Con-
gress may not select what it reasonably believes is the most effective way 
to rernedy unconstitutional racial discrimination when that discrimina-
tion falls short of the type that defined Alabama in 1965. 
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Chief Justice Roberts, however, makes clear that the discrimination 
justice Ginsburg described was insufficient not simply because Jim 
Crow-era discrimination was worse. He explained that it was also flawed 
because it involved problems that were different in kind from those that 
first prompted Congress to enact the regime. He wrote, "The dissent 
relies on 'second-generation barriers,' which are not impediments to 
the casting of ballots, but rather electoral arrangements that affect the 
weight of minority votes."28 ln other words, the discrimination that Jus-
tice Ginsburg described differed from the type of discrimination cap-
tured by the original coverage formula, which was "based on voting tests 
and access to the ballot, not vote dilution.''24 This difference, apparently, 
renders contemporary discrimination legally insufficient to justify Con-
gress's decision to retain the original coverage formula.25 
Much like the observation that contemporary discrimination is not as 
rough as the Jim Crow variety, the Chief Justice's suggestion that second-
generation barriers are off-point demands more explanation than he 
provided. It is true, of course, that the coverage formula invalidated by 
Shelby County made no mention of so-called second-generation prob-
lems, such as the practice of manipulating district lines to inhibit minor-
ity influence, and was based instead on the use of tests and devices and 
low voter participation.26 But that fact hardly means that the practices 
grouped as "second-generation" are unrelated to the concerns Congress 
meant to target when it crafted the coverage formula. In fact, just the 
opposite is true. 
So-called second-generation practices predate the VRA by decades 
and stand with the white primary, the literacy test, the poll tax, and other 
tactics that were used concurrently in the Jim Crow South to ensure 
that African American citizens lacked the ability to cast ''meaningful"27 
ballots and to "strip" them "of every vestige of influence" in selecting 
public officials. 28 True, Congress relied on the use of tests and devices 
as the "trigger" for the original coverage formula, but it did so not in 
order to limit the statute's reach. Instead, it selected the specified trigger 
because it captured with remarkable accuracy the places that engaged in 
the broader range of conduct (including "second-generation'' conduct) 
that had rendered the Fifteenth Amendment a nullity throughout the 
pre-VRA South.29 The statutory trigger linked tests and devices to low 
participation, but the statute's target was never so limited.30 
The Supreme Court itself recognized as much in 1969.31 justice Harlan 
disagreed at the time,32 and Justices Thomas and Scalia would do so 
later.33 But a majority of the Court has repeatedly recognized congres-
sional intent for the VRA to apply to these practices and confirmed 
Congress's power to deploy the VRA in this way. Chief Justice Roberts's 
270 A Nat1on of W1dening Opportunities 
opinion in Shelby County nevertheless suggested otherwise but did not 
explain why. 
What is clear, however, is what the opinion as written accomplished. It 
brought the preclearance regime to an immediate and, perhaps perma-
nent,34 halt, even as it countenanced evidence of widespread and ongo-
ing discrimination. This discrimination, to be sure, fell short of the Jim 
Crow norm and did not directly involve those "tests or devices" listed in 
the original coverage formula. It was discrimination, nevertheless, and 
a good deal of it ran afoul of the Constitution. Critically, Chief Justice 
Roberts never suggested otherwise. Indeed, he seemed to agree with Jus-
tice Ginsburg when she wrote that it was still raining in coveredjurisdic-
tions and that it would continue to rain, predictably, for some time to 
come. At a minimum, the Chief Justice said nothing that called her fore-
cast into question. 
Therein lies Shelby County's significance. The decision displays the 
Court's willingness to discard an umbrella on a rainy day with full 
knowledge that rain will continue. It may have been raining harder in 
the past, and the present rainstorm may (or may not) differ in other ways 
from what came before. Regardless, the Shelby County majority opted to 
toss out an umbrella in the middle of a rainstorm, fully aware of what it 
was doing. 
The umbrella at issue in Shelby County was an unusual one, and it is 
certainly arguable that the Court's willingness to discard it rested on its 
distinctive features. Long considered strong medicine, the VRA's pre-
clearance requirement reversed the presumption of validity that typ-
ically attaches to legislative and administrative action, and presumed 
instead that public officials in places subject to the requirement were 
engaged in discrimination unless and until they could convince a federal 
official otherwise.35 
It turned out, however, that this defining aspect of the preclearance 
regime was less controversial in Shelby County than the regime's limited 
geographic reach. The fact that the preclearance obligation existed in 
some places but not others has always bristled,36 but it had also been 
thought to contribute to the regime's legitimacy. Far from a blanket 
obligation, preclearance had long been seen as a targeted remedy, apply-
ing only in places where the need for it was most acute. Indeed, geogra-
phy was one reason justice Kennedy once cited the VRA as the paradig-
matic example of congruent and p roportionallegislation.37 
That, of course, was nearly two decades ago, and times change, as Lhe 
Chief Justice has reminded us.38 Ultimately, it was the regime's limited 
geographic application that contributed more directly to its downfall in 
Shelby County than its burden-shifting requirements.39 A majority of the 
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Justices found themselves unconvinced that places subject to the statute 
were sufficiently different from other places to justify their being sub-
jected to the statute's distinct requirements. And it was this skepticism 
that may best explain the Court's willingness to scrap the regime. 
If so, the Shelby County majority's willingness to discard preclearance 
in the face of persistent, documented discrimination might be dismissed 
as a regime-specific move to secure a desired end. Whether the Court 
was more troubled by the regime's geographic selectivity or the burden-
shifting obligations it imposed, it was convinced that preclearance had 
to go. Under this view, the holding is consequential, to be sure, but only 
because the specific statute the decision incapacitated was itself a conse-
quential one, in terms of both its real world effect and the salient place it 
occupied in the public's imagination. 
And yet, this reading of Shelby County is not, in my view, the best read-
ing of the decision. Rather than simply charting a one-time path to a 
desired destination, the Court's willingness to discard an umbrella in 
the rain is better understood within a broader jurisprudence, described 
below. 
Ill. Is It Raining Elsewhere? 
Far from unique, SheLby County's tolerance for ongoing discrimination 
represents a common stance in modern civil rights Jaw. In numerous 
cases, the Court has limited federal antidiscrimination measures such 
as the VRA, Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) in the face of uncontested evidence of discrimination of the sort 
the statutes at issue were designed to address. These cases, moreover, all 
generated dissenting opinions, often written by Justice Ginsburg, which 
disputed both the holdings and the analytical moves used to reach them. 
Situated within Justice Ginsburg's Shelby County construct, these dissent-
ing opinions all argued that an umbrella should be used in the rain, 
while a majority, time and again, sided with getting wet. 
Consider a few eclectic but representative examples. 
Nassar and Gross: Two days before the Court handed down Shelby 
County, it held that an employee alleging retaliation under Title VII 
needed to show that the complaints he lodged about status-based dis-
crimination not only contributed to his being denied a coveted transfer 
but also were the but-for cause of that denial. University of Texas South-
western Medical Center v. Nassar-4° relied heavily on the Court's 2009 rul-
ing in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., which applied the same rule to 
an employee alleging age discrimination under the ADEA.41 Both deci-
sions deemed the employees involved to be ineligible for the more for-
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giving "motivating factor" analysis Congress set forth in § 703m of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991.42 The Court split 5-4 in both cases, with dis-
senting opinions by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens challenging the way 
the majority understood relevant precedent, the purpose and structure 
of the 1991 CRA, and applicable agency action.43 
Amid this disagreement, however, all of the Justices seemed to 
agree-or, at least, no one denied-that the plaintiff-employees who 
brought both cases had been subjected to intentional discrimination of 
the sort the statutes at issue targeted44-namely, that Naiel Nassar's com-
plaints about disparate treatment based on his Middle Eastern descent 
contributed to his being denied a transfer,45 and that Jack Gross's age 
contributed to the restructuring of job responsibilities he challenged.46 
In both cases, then, the Justices seemed well aware and willing to accept 
that intent-based discrimination had occurred. They split over whether 
the employees should be entitled to relief given this discrimination. 
Put differently, no one doubted that the employees who brought these 
cases had been caught in the rain. What they disagreed about was 
whether they were entitled to the umbrella provided by Title VII and the 
ADEA. And a majority held they were not. 
Coleman: A year before Nassar, the Court struck down a provision of 
the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) that guaranteed twelve weeks 
of unpaid medical leave to eligible employees suffering from serious 
medical conditions.47 Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in Coleman v. 
Court of Appeals of Maryland argued that the sex-neutral "self-care" pro-
vision constituted an essential part of a comprehensive statutory regime 
that included the family care provisions that the Court had already 
upheld.48 She explained that Congress crafted this regime to address the 
pervasive discrimination women confronted in the workplace stemming 
from pregnancy-related issues and more general sex stereotypes about 
family care responsibilities.49 
Justice Ginsburg did not invoke umbrella imagery in Coleman, but she 
might easily have employed it. Her argument, at bottom, was that the 
umbrella provided by the FMLA would have a gaping hole in it without 
the statute's self-care provision. The self-care provision, she explained, 
"serves to blunt the force of stereotypes of women as primary caregivers 
by increasing the odds that men and women will invoke the FMLA's 
leave provisions in near-equal numbers."50 
A majority of the Court, however, was unmoved. Justice Kennedy's 
plurality opinion held that the relationship between the self-care pro-
vision and the discrimination Justice Ginsburg described was too com-
plex and attenuated to satisfy constitutional scrutiny.51 And yet, much 
like Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in Shelby County, Justice Kennedy's 
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opinion in Coleman did not question the prevalence of the discrimina-
tion justice Ginsburg described. 52 Like the Chief justice, moreover, jus-
tice Kennedy opted to discard the umbrella Congress crafted to address 
that discrimination. 
Ledbetter: In 2007, a majority of the Court held that an employee's 
claim for sex-based wage discrimination was time barred because she 
filed suit long after the employer's initial discriminatory wage decision. 
Justice Alito's majority opinion in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co.53 held that the statute of limitations ran from that initial decision 
rather than from the issuance of subsequent paychecks, the amount of 
which reflected the initial discrimination.54 
Justice Ginsburg's dissent argued that the statute was better read to 
allow Ledbetter's suit to proceed, an argument she might easily have 
bolstered by invoking the umbrella image she employed in Shelby 
County. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg's dissent made clear that Goodyear had 
been raining on Lilly Ledbetter for a very long time and that Title VII 
should be available to provide her relief. justice Ginsburg closed her 
opinion calling for a statutory amendment to reverse the majority's rul-
ing, a call Congress heeded. 55 
The majority in Ledbetter was not persuaded by Justice Ginsburg's 
argument, but it never questioned that Goodyear had intentionally dis-
criminated against Ledbetter based on sex by paying her less than both 
similarly situated and less-qualified male colleagues. Justice Alito 
expressed no doubt about this point. But in his view, Ledbetter's failure 
to use the Title VII umbrella at the beginning of the storm precluded her 
from using it later. 
Bossier Parish: Like Ledbetter, Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board was 
reversed by subsequent statutory amendment (albeit one that was later 
ruled to be unconstitutional).56 Back in 2000, Justice Scalia's majority 
opinion held that the VRA permitted implementation of a districting 
plan in which African American voters constituted a majority in none of 
the plan's twelve electoral districts. It was alleged and, somewhat surpris-
ingly, stipulated that the School Board had refused to draw a majority-
minority district because it wanted to prevent an African American 
candidate from being elected to the board. 57 
Justice Scalia's majority opinion held that the redistricting plan could 
be implemented notwithstanding this discriminatory purpose. The 
opinion explained that § 5 of the VRA did not block implementation of 
electoral changes enacted with discriminatory intent. Instead, it blocked 
only that subset of electoral changes enacted with "retrogressive" 
intent-that is, the intent to make things worse for the minority group 
in question. Mere animus would not suffice.58 The opinion, moreover, 
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suggested any rule to the contrary would raise a serious constitutional 
question. 59 
Justice Souter's dissent argued that electoral changes enacted with 
a discriminatory, albeit not "retrogressive" purpose, fell within the § 
5 proscription. As he put it, blocking implementation of unconstitu-
tional conduct of this sort-the rain Justice Ginsburg subsequently 
described-was precisely what Congress had designed§ 5 to address and 
what Congress, in his view, had ample power to mandate. 60 
Thirteen years later, Shelby County made clear that Congress lacks this 
power. The decision viewed Congress's 2006 decision to adopt Justice 
Souter's Bossier Parish reading as evidence of constitutional overreach. It 
thereby suggested Congress had no power to include within the statu-
tory proscription conduct that was unconstitutional.61 
Bossier Parish, Ledbetter, Coleman, Gross, and Nassar are, without doubt, 
distinguishable from one another on numerous grounds. Yet they share 
a defining characteristic that makes them representative examples of 
a more general stance in federal civil rights law. Like Shelby County, 
these decisions all circumscribe the federal regime in contexts in which 
the occurrence of intentional, invidious, and even unconstitutional con-
duct is left unquestioned. Placed within Justice Ginsburg's Shelby County 
framework, these cases all involved rain; the Court knew it, and a major-
ity was nevertheless steadfast that an umbrella should not be used. 
Admittedly, likening the discrimination observed in these cases to rain 
is a contestable move. My premise is that discrimination may be dis-
tinguished from liability, at least in certain contexts, and that we learn 
something by making this distinction. That premise accordingly rejects 
the idea that discrimination is necessarily or most usefully understood 
as a legal conclusion that is coextensive with liability. Instead, it posits 
that people like Naiel Nassar and Lilly Ledbetter found themselves in the 
rain even though the Court ruled against them. They lost despite the fact 
that it was raining and decidedly not because the Court thought the sky 
was clear. 
Understanding the cases in this manner-that is, by parsing discrim-
ination from liability-brings into focus a distinct strand of civil rights 
jurisprudence. To be sure, judicial skepticism toward the federal civil 
rights regime is nothing new, and the Court has long sought to scale back 
federal antidiscrimination law. Decisions that do so in the face of uncon-
tested evidence of intentional discrimination are undoubtedly part of 
this effort. And yet, my claim is that they are a distinct component of 
it. Unlike those cases that deny relief by deeming challenged conduct to 
be nondiscriminatory, these decisions discard the umbrella even as the 
need for it persists. The suggestion is that the federal civil rights project, 
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while hardly complete, is no longer worth pursuing. Rather than a mis-
sion accomplished, it is a mission abandoned. 
Of course, not every decision circumscribing the federal civil rights 
regime falls decisively into one group or the other. Some deny the rain, 
or at least express skepticism about it, but also voice mistrust about 
using the available umbrella should the rain alleged actually be falling. 62 
Elsewhere, however, the distinction is clear, with a growing number of 
decisions displaying a willingness to discard the umbrella in the rain 
knowing full well people will get wet as a result. 
Shelby County's willingness to immobilize§ 5 of the VRA without dis-
puting the discrimination justice Ginsburg described is part of this latter 
group of decisions. Far from unique, Shelby County stands with a host of 
other decisions that acknowledge discrimination persists and yet posit 
that core elements of the federal civil rights project are no longer worth 
pursuing. The next section explores why this sensibility drives so much 
of contemporary antidiscrimination law. 
IV. On Unjust Enrichment and Harmless Error 
Decisions that limit federal antidiscrimination law typically view the 
regime's broader application as deeply problematic. Among the con-
cerns most often cited is the worry that an expansive approach to the 
regime encourages frivolous lawsuits, exposing employers and other 
defendants to wasteful litigation costs and spurring inefficient defensive 
decision making.63 Curb the regime, it is argued, lest undeserving plain-
tiffs be unjustly enriched at the expense of diligent defendants and, in 
many circumstances, the rest of us. 
Animating this concern is the suspicion that frivolous claims outnum-
ber legitimate ones and that the discrimination federal antidiscrimina-
tion law was crafted to address is largely a thing of the past. Unsurpris-
ingly, decisions that find challenged conduct to be nondiscriminatory 
highlight this sensibility, with the dispute at hand seen either to involve 
a frivolous claim or to suggest circumstances in which one might find 
expression. 64 
Less expected, decisions that deny relief in the face of uncontested 
discrimination also voice concern that frivolous claims are rising as 
genuine discrimination declines. These decisions acknowledge the rain 
but deem it insufficiently worrisome to warrant use of the umbrella at 
issue.65 More pressing is the need to check the regime and guard against 
its unjustified application. 
Under this view, victims of documented discrimination might be 
understood or even dismissed as unfortunate, but unavoidable, collat-
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eral damage sacrificed for the greater good. And yet, it is not the 
unpleasantness of the image that keeps it off the pages of U.S. reports but 
instead the belief that the victims of discrimination in these cases have 
not been significantly damaged at all. True, they have been caught in the 
rain, but these decisions suggest that getting wet may not be as damag-
ing as some seem to think. In fact, they suggest it might not be damaging 
at all. 
With this suggestion, Shelby County and cases like it shift the terrain on 
which civil rights disputes have long been fought. Rather than contest 
allegations or evidence of discrimination, they dismiss discrimination 
itself as inconsequential. They reject justice Ginsburg's belief that get-
ting caught in the rain is the source of endming damage and, in its place, 
insert the idea of harmless error into civil rights jurisprudence. 
That idea, in turn, has led the Court to view much of federal antidis-
crimination law as providing a windfall to its beneficiaries. Far from 
making victims of discrimination whole, the regime is seen as leaving 
them in a decidedly better position than they would have been had they 
never gotten wet. The umbrella Justice Ginsburg thinks provides vital 
protection is seen instead to be a source of unjust enrichment to those 
it shields. The resulting project consequently becomes one dedicated to 
limiting use of the umbrella whenever possible, rain notwithstanding. 
Hence, the recent mixed-motive decisions requiring plaintiffs to show 
"but-for" causation work hard to make sure that getting wet is not the 
vehicle for getting ahead. These decisions hold that if, absent the dis-
crimination alleged, the plaintiff would have been denied the disputed 
promotion or transfer, the discrimination itself should not be the source 
of liability.66 Because Title VII's "motivating" factor rule allows for lia-
bility in such circumstances,67 Nassar and Gross rejected it, finding the 
plaintiff-employees ineligible for both the acknowledgment of wrong-
doing a liability ruling embodies and the attorneys' fees that accompany 
it. Of no moment was the fact that the rejected approach barred injunc-
tive relief when the desired transfer or promotion would have otherwise 
been denied.68 
As telling, and perhaps even more so, is a little noted aspect of Chief 
Justice Roberts's opinion in Shelby County, in which he described the 
2006 amendment overruling Bossier Parish to "prohibit laws that couLd 
have favored [minority voters] but did not do so because of a discrimina-
tory purpose."69 The words "could have favored" are revealing. Far from 
unartful drafting, they suggest that the Bossier Parish School Board did 
not injure minority voters when it adopted a districting plan avowedly 
designed to prevent the election of an African American representative. 
Instead, Shelby County suggests that the school board's unconstitutional 
justice Ginsburg's Umbrella 277 
conduct only blocked adoption of a plan "that could have favored" black 
voters. The broader suggestion is that unconstitutional discrimination 
does not necessarily deny minority voters an equal opportunity to par-
ticipate in the political process but instead may simply deprive them of 
favored or preferential treatment. 
That suggestion is a remarkable one, and one that documents the 
extent to which the locus of civil rights jurisprudence has shifted. A long-
standing worry in this realm has been the concern that the prohibition 
on disparate impact would devolve into a mandate for affirmative action 
and prompt potential defendants to adopt preferential policies in order 
to shield themselves from liability.7° To guard against this result (and its 
apparent conflict with explicit statutory language), the Court has long 
refused to read bans on disparate impact expansively. 
But now, this concern about preferential treatment is also shaping 
the Court's approach to discriminatory intent. In a growing number 
of cases, it has read the VRA, Title VII, and other federal civil rights 
measures narrowly in contexts where animus was evident (or at least 
evidence of it went unchallenged}, and it has done so because more 
expansive statutory readings were thought to yield unwarranted prefer-
ential treatmem. Notably absent from these cases is a well-intentioned 
defendant laboring to comply with a statutory mandate. Instead, the 
Court has come to see federal antidiscrimination law itself as the source 
of damaging preferences. Even the prohibition on invidious intent, the 
core tenet of federal civil rights law, has evolved into a problem and 
hence a target. It is what needs to be constrained, if not eliminated, while 
the conduct the regime once targeted is dismissed as harmless and those 
once understood as victims are transformed into the unjustly enriched. 
V. Conclusion 
The Court has long sought to scale back the federal civil rights regime 
and has typically done so by characterizing challenged conduct as 
nondiscriminatory. This chapter tracks a distinct line of cases that are 
undeniably part of the larger effort but that limit the regime while rec-
ognizing discrimination rather than denying it. These decisions throw 
out an umbrella in a rainstorm, knowing full well it is raining and that 
the rain will continue. They accordingly posit that the rain does less 
damage than the umbrella, at least in certain circumstances, and that the 
Court is institutionally able to figure out the circumsrances in which the 
umbrella should be discarded. 
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